Yugoslavia: the NATO Operation before Ukraine
Many
people who have come of age in this decade may know nothing about Yugoslavia or
may not even know that there was ever such a country. I have written several
posts about what happened there in the 1990s (see the notes below), and this
one will serve as an overview and a lens through which people can understand
what the NATO alliance began to do a few years later in Ukraine in the hope of
weakening and balkanizing Russia as it did in the Balkan region and the USSR
before that.
“I think that, unfortunately, Ukraine is
disappearing, but it’s our fault... We have to accept, in fact, a
narcissistic wound... The West must say, ‘Alright, we went too far. We
pushed. Russia responded, and we continued.’ It’s time to stop now.
Otherwise, it could end very badly or last for years, with all the associated
problems for Europe... in Europe the energy crisis had been hanging over us
for years anyway. It was an American idea to cut off Russian gas, cut off
Germany from Russia etc., but it could be worse. We could have an exodus of
millions of people... This is where geopolitics hits its limits. My wish for
everyone [for the new year] is that they at least change their way of
thinking a little, grow a little bit, rise above the mediocrity, beyond the
pure will for domination that does not usually lead to anything worthwhile.” - Caroline Galactéros, president of Géopragma, Interview with Irina Dubois, December
19, 2022. |
Background
Yugoslavia
was located between East and West and was at the crossroads of the empires that
came into conflict in WWI, and at the crossroads between European Christianity,
Orthodox Christianity, and the Islamic world.
The
most significant event of the 20th century may be the Bolshevik revolution in
Russia in October 1917. This set the stage for the great conflict of the
century: capitalism vs. socialism. The capitalist countries (US, UK, France,
Germany, and others) reacted immediately against the revolution in Russia. The
most extreme reaction came later from Nazi Germany and fascist Italy in the
1930s and 1940s. In this conflict, Croatia allied itself with Germany and Italy
between 1929 and 1945 and founded the fascist nationalist movement known as
Ustasha. Serbia took the side of the USSR (with whom they had cultural roots
through the Christian Orthodox Church). Ustasha members murdered hundreds of
thousands of Serbs, Jews, and Roma as well as political dissidents in
Yugoslavia during World War II.[1]
After
WWII, the Balkan Peninsula was unified as a multi-ethnic socialist state called
Yugoslavia, led by Josip Tito. This was a tremendous achievement because, in
addition to the challenge of uniting such a religiously and ethnically diverse
region, there was the fact that Croatia had been a Nazi ally and had carried
out massive atrocities against Serbians, Jews, and other minorities. The Serbian
and Montenegrin partisans had put up a famous resistance with the help of
Soviet, American, and British allies. Twenty years later, the new Yugoslavian
state had become successful in providing good living standards, and it resolved
(or suppressed, as many would assert) historical tensions between Croatia,
Bosnia, and Serbia. Tito had bad relations with Stalin after WWII, and thus
Yugoslavia developed its own form of socialism independently, and it was more
open and friendly to Europe and the NATO nations. In fact, Tito had made
promises to NATO that he would block a Soviet advance if war broke out.[2]
By the 1960s, Yugoslavia was a popular travel destination for Europeans. In
1970, no one could have foreseen the war that would erupt in the Balkans in the
1990s.
When
Tito died in 1980, the Soviet Union was entering a period of instability, and all
of Europe was entering a new era of economic disruption and neoliberal doctrine.
The governments of the US, UK, France, and Germany wondered what to do about
Yugoslavia. They could have helped it stay together, but they didn’t want to
preserve its independent socialist economy. They wanted it to come into the EU
and NATO system with a capitalist economy. They decided to promote nationalism
and break Yugoslavia up into independent states, and, interestingly, modern
Germany became very keen to help Croatia, a former Nazi ally, achieve independence.
This was a shock to Serbians because they had memories of the Croatian
atrocities against them. Tensions and mistrust escalated at a time when there
was tremendous economic insecurity and people turned to demagogic leaders. Wars
broke out in the early 1990s and lasted until the end of the decade.[3]
People
of all the minority groups lived throughout Yugoslavia, so it was no simple
matter to break the country into separate geographical zones called Bosnia,
Serbia, and Croatia and so on. There were Serbian and Bosnian minorities in
Croatia, and likewise in the other parts of Yugoslavia—Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo, Slovenia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. During the war, atrocities
were committed by all sides, but in general the US, UK, France, and Germany
decided that the Serbians were “the bad guys” and Serbia was attacked by NATO
forces for three months in the spring of 1999, after a long campaign of
vilification that had gone on for several years.
Twenty-four
years later, it is still difficult to discuss the root causes of this war and
the atrocities committed during it. European and American media and
historiography depicted Serbia as the sole perpetrator and described the
outbreak of war as just the mysterious reappearance of ancient ethnic hatreds.
In 1999, the media justified the NATO attack on Serbia as a necessary “humanitarian
intervention,” regardless of the massive level of destruction by aerial
bombardment required to be so humane.[4]
Noam
Chomsky commented on the war in an interview he gave in 2006:
Actually,
we have for the first time a very authoritative comment on that from the
highest level of the Clinton administration, which is something that one could
have surmised before, but now it is asserted. This is from Strobe Talbott who
ran the Pentagon/State Department intelligence Joint Committee on the diplomacy
during the whole affair including the bombing, so that’s the very top of
Clinton administration. He just wrote the foreword to a book by his Director of
Communications, John Norris, and in the foreword, he says if you really want to
understand what the thinking was of the top of the Clinton administration, this
is the book you should read. Take a look at John Norris’s book. What he says is
that the real purpose of the war had nothing to do with concern for Kosovar
Albanians. It was because Serbia was not carrying out the required social and
economic reforms, meaning it was the last corner of Europe which had not
subordinated itself to the US-run neoliberal programs, so therefore it had to
be eliminated. That’s from the highest level. Again, we could have guessed it,
but I’ve never seen it said before.[5]
In
an interview recorded in 2009, French General Pierre-Marie Gallois denounced
the European powers’ lack of commitment
to peace and the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and the Helsinki
accords to preserve borders as they were. He decried the violation of these
principles evident in the efforts of Germany, the United States, France, and
the UK to redraw the borders of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The purported reason
for the breakup—that Yugoslavia was too big and too multi-ethnic to be
viable—made no sense. The resulting smaller states would be just as
multi-ethnic and possibly more non-viable than Yugoslavia. Mr. Gallois
concluded:
Westerners
performed absolutely unethically, with a duplicity that shocked me, as it came
from the purported creators of human rights—France, the UK, and to some extent
Germany. Nevertheless, old demons, particularly German ones, re-emerged and
created the existing chaos in these lands, whether it was Bosnia, Republika
Srpska, or Kosovo.[6]
The
following excerpt from Diana Johnstone’s book Fool’s Crusade gives a sobering
account of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, developed by the Clinton
administration, that redefined NATO’s role after the Cold War, turning it into an
aggressive alliance beyond international law with a self-appointed role to act
outside of countries in the alliance “where there may be little or no
host-nation support.” This doctrine made it clear that NATO had given itself
the right to invade other countries whenever it felt its “stability” was
threatened. The new concept also dashed any hopes of nuclear disarmament, as nuclear
weapons were deemed essential because conventional forces could not provide
adequate deterrent force.
Looking
back on the years leading up to the war that started in Ukraine in 2022, we can
see how the NATO Strategic Concept of the 1990s has been adapted to provoke
Russia. Because Russia has its own nuclear deterrent, it could not be attacked
directly, so Ukraine was slowly turned into an economic, military and political
dependency of NATO, then it was used to supposedly weaken Russia during many
years of conflict and economic war.
__________
Diana
Johnstone, Fools’ Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions, Postscript:
Perpetual War, (New York: Monthly Review Press, London: Pluto Press, 2002), 265-269
NATO’S
birthday present
NATO’s
50th birthday celebration was held in Washington between 23 and 25 April 1999.
The bombing of Yugoslavia had been going on for a month. Thanks to Kosovo, NATO
was already asserting its new role as a “humanitarian” strike force unlimited
by geographical boundaries or international law. The anniversary was the
occasion for official adoption of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, prepared by the
Clinton administration and accepted by Allied leaders obliged to make a strong
show of unity in the midst of a war. The Strategic Concept includes three
important elements which clinch the dominance of the United States over its
European allies.
1.
Nuclear weapons. The Strategic Concept emphatically laid to rest any remaining
hope of nuclear disarmament since “the Alliance’s conventional forces alone
cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution
in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and
unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.” Moreover, nuclear
weapons must remain in Europe “for the foreseeable future.” The demand of the
peace movement of the 1980s for a denuclearized Europe was thereby definitively
rejected. “The presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in
Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to
that of North America.” Thus, “the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable
future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe
and kept up to date where necessary...”
2.
Interdependence. The “inseparable link” between North America (that is, the
United States) and Europe is central to the Strategic Concept. There will be no
wriggling out of the grip of U.S.-dominated NATO on the part of the European
Union or of individual member states. Thus, “The principle of collective effort
in Alliance defense is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the
Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of
collective defense, and prevent the renationalization of defense policies,
without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty.”
3.
The prospect of more “out-of-area” war. This is couched in the usual terms of
reluctant acceptance of duty: “Regional and, in particular, geostrategic
considerations within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, as
instabilities on NATO’s periphery could lead to crisis or conflicts requiring
an Alliance military response, potentially with short warning times.” The
Concept points to the “special logistical challenges” involved in mounting and
sustaining “operations outside the Allies’ territory, where there may be little
or no host-nation support.” This can only mean invading countries where NATO is
not wanted.
The
vaguely defined “security interests” of NATO member states were seen to be
threatened, no longer by Soviet communism, but by “risks of a wider nature,
including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the
disruption of the flow of vital resources” as well as “uncontrolled movements
of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts.”
Threats
all around
After
the suicide airliner bombings of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, it
was commonly said that “the world changed on September 11.” One thing that had
not changed, however, was the Pentagon’s aggressive strategy. The attacks
merely provided the most persuasive excuse for inflating the military budget
since the Soviet threat. In the foreword to the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense
Review Report issued on 30 September 2001, defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld
pointed out that the review and report were “largely completed before the
September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. In important ways, these
attacks confirm the strategic direction and planning principles that resulted
from this review.” September 11 will “require the U.S. to move forward more
rapidly in these directions.”
The
Pentagon’s stated objective is to protect and advance U.S. national interests
that “span the world.” This involves precluding hostile domination of “critical
areas, particularly Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the
Middle East and Southwest Asia.”
The
essential innovation concerns the definition of “threats.” From its pinnacle of
power, the United States can scarcely perceive any tangible threats. Instead of
feeling safer, the “defense” planners imagine potential threats everywhere.
These go beyond invisible “terrorists” or recalcitrant “rogues.” From now on,
the United States fears the very potential of anybody, anywhere, to have the
capability to pose any sort of threat. The Pentagon has undertaken to “shift
the basis of defense planning from a ‘threat-based’ model that has dominated
thinking in the past to a ‘capabilities-based’ model for the future.” The
question is not who might be an adversary but what anybody might be able to do.
In short, any country with the capability to be an adversary could be one, and
so the strategy requires preventing any country from having the capability.
Meanwhile,
the United States will spend upwards of $500 billion a year to develop every
possible “capability” of its own. A few direct quotes from this remarkable
document give the tone:
- Although the United States will not face a peer competitor in the near future, the potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten stability in regions critical to U.S. interests.
- US forces must maintain the capability at the direction of the President to impose the will of the United States and its coalition partners on any adversaries, including states or non-state entities.
- Such a decisive defeat could include changing the regime of an adversary state or occupation of foreign territory until U.S. strategic objectives are met.
- For the United States, the revolution in military affairs holds the potential to confer enormous advantages and to extend the current period of U.S. military superiority.
- A reorientation of the posture must take account of new challenges, particularly anti-access and area-denial threats. New combinations of immediately employable forward stationed and deployed forces; globally available reconnaissance, strike, and command and control assets; information operations capabilities; and rapidly deployable, highly lethal and sustainable forces that may come from outside a theater of operations have the potential to be a significant force multiplier for forward stationed forces, including forcible entry forces.
It
is hard to see what “forcible entry forces” would be doing against “anti-access
and area denial threats” other than invading foreign countries. Here is the
bottom line to “globalization”, and it signifies world economic domination
enforced by military means.
Power
has its own momentum. Whatever the declared motives, the war against Yugoslavia
served as an exercise in the destruction of a country. The pretext is flexible:
harboring terrorists, building weapons of mass destruction, or “humanitarian
catastrophe”—all can be used to justify bombing as part of an unfolding
strategy of global control.
With
its military supremacy demonstrated, the United States shows signs of leaving
its NATO allies on the sidelines as it pursues unilateral action in the rest of
the world. The proclaimed intention to destroy an expandable list of designated
enemies is causing growing alarm in the world at large, and even among European
leaders.
Should
the tough unilateralist approach of the second Bush presidency cause serious
disaffection among allies, U.S. leaders have the option of returning to the
soft approach of “humanitarian war” that proved so successful in silencing
critics and rallying support. To keep that option open, the partners in crime
must continue to impose their own mythical version of the 1999 NATO crusade.
The fiction must be told and retold of rescuing innocent victims from wicked
villains. But the story is not over and there is more truth to tell.
Diana Johnstone, Fools’ Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions, Postscript: Perpetual War, (New York: Monthly Review Press, London: Pluto Press, 2002), 265-269
__________
Also
recommended
Michael
Parenti, To Kill a Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia (Verso, 2002)
Notes
[1] Memorial message for the victims of Jasenovac, April 22, 2021 (video 5 minutes).
[2] Dennis Riches, “The Yugoslavia Counter-Narrative in 1993: Sean Gervasi, a neglected
expert, spoke out in the early years of the catastrophe,” (video and transcript), November 18,
2018.
[3] Dennis Riches, “Pierre-Marie Gallois on the
Origins of and Responsibility for the Yugoslav Wars (1990-99),” July 29, 2018. (Video of the interview, in French).
[4] “NATO war crimes/Kosovo,” Better
World Info, accessed December 29, 2022.
[5]
Dennis
Riches, “Military Humanism:
Heart of Neoliberal Darkness in the Balkans” (transcript of Interview
with Noam Chomsky), February 18, 2017. See
also: Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo
(Pluto Press, 1999).
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