A former French parliamentarian and minister defends France’s role in Rwanda
Paul Quilès
belonged to the Socialist Party and was elected to the French National Assembly
for several terms during his career—most recently 1993-2007, as well other
terms beginning in 1978. He was president of the National Assembly Commission
for National Defense (1997-2002), Minister of Defense (1985-86) and held other
cabinet appointments during his career. In retirement he founded Initiatives for
Nuclear Disarmament. In 2014 he wrote an editorial in Le Monde
defending France’s role in Rwanda and defending the work of the 1998 Parliamentary
Commission on Rwanda for which he was responsible. The following is a translation
of the complete version of his editorial (not the version published in Le
Monde) published on his personal blog.
Translated
by Dennis Riches
by Paul
Quilès, April 8,
2014
As
the former president of the parliamentary commission on Rwanda (1998), I wanted
to make the following points which seemed necessary in the climate of confusion
created by the statements made by Rwandan president, Paul Kagame.
A
part of this text was published in Le
Monde under the title Rwanda: Let’s
put a stop to aberrant accusations (Rwanda:
en finir avec les accusations aberrantes).
The
genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda [1] is one of the great tragedies of the 20th
century. Twenty years ago, the world witnessed once again an attempt to
exterminate a group of people based on their ethnic origin.
Since
that time, we have seen a flood of accounts and testimonials in which it is
often difficult to discern the truthfulness of what is stated as fact. Analyses
are sometimes contradictory and polemic, and often violent.
Certain
accusations against France were formulated in good faith by persons whose lives
were truly ravaged, but who believe wrongly that our country [France], the only
country engaged since the early 1990s in trying to stop the escalation of
murderous attacks in Rwanda, did not intervene militarily to use force to stop
the genocide.
Aberrant
accusations
Other
accusations had the goal of discrediting all French engagement in Africa. These
were more in evidence recently due to the responsibilities assumed by France in
Mali, in Central Africa, with the approval of the international community. Yet
the accusations became less intense when the United States distanced itself
from the regime of Paul Kagame, responsible for grave interference in eastern
Congo where he supported a rebel movement, M23, which was responsible for
large-scale recruitment of child soldiers. This interference and the methods employed
were condemned by several countries, as well as the UN Security Council, which
suspended their aid to Rwanda. [2]
It
is perfectly normal to critically evaluate the foreign policy of France, and
certain questions are legitimate. But some questions are from accusers who act
like prosecutors, affected by exaggeration, simplification and partiality.[3]
According to some of these accusations, which are regularly refuted but
repeated endlessly, France supported a dictatorial regime based on ethnic
exclusion, with the goal of preserving a zone of influence in Africa. France
purportedly allowed the regime to disseminate racist propaganda and engage in
massacres that paved the way to the genocide. France purportedly contributed
military aid for the preparation for genocide. France is accused of supporting
the formation of a de facto government made up of the leaders of the
genocide. France is believed to have refused to help victims and even assisted
the leaders of the genocide in escaping from Rwanda before the definitive
victory of the RPF.
These
aberrant accusations were often considered, and their lack of foundation was
exposed as they were addressed point by point by the facts established by the
1998 parliamentary commission over which I presided, as well as by the
testimonies of persons involved that have been gathered since 1998. [4]
The 1998
Parliamentary Report
After
nine months of work, punctuated by numerous public hearings, open to the press
and even televised live, we published a 1,500-page report. This set a precedent
because the parliament had intervened in the presumed “privileged domain” of
national defense and foreign policy. We demonstrated that we were not
complacent in analyzing the mistakes France had made in understanding the
realities of Rwandan politics.
To
better understand these, one must remember that after independence, in the
early 1960s, the Hutus overthrew the Tutsi monarchy [5] which had been upheld
by the German and Belgian colonizers. The Hutus massacred a large number of
Tutsis. Close to half of them fled to Uganda, while others stayed. This
situation defined Rwandan politics for the decades that followed: Tutsis living
abroad wanted to return to their lost country, and Hutus wanted to stop them,
and thereby Tutsis inside the country were subjected to constant discrimination
and persecution.
France
believed it could integrate this small nation into the larger group of
French-speaking African nations [As a former Belgian colony, French was already
established as a second official language]. The aid that France gave to Rwanda,
so that it could defend itself from RPF [Rwanda Patriotic Front] attacks from
Uganda, was accompanied by efforts to democratize the regime and leave in place
a government, a parliament and an armed forces represented by both ethnicities,
Hutu and Tutsi. These efforts led to the success of the Arusha Accords [6],
which were sponsored by France and would permit French forces to withdraw,
ceding the peace-keeping role to UN forces.
However,
these accords were considered by Hutu extremists as a provisional concession,
and the RPF remained ambiguous about its real intentions. In this context of
mistrust and hatred, the strongly centralized political power structure in
Rwanda held the means with which to lead the Hutu population toward violence.
The assassination of President Habyarimana [7] and the Hutu and Tutsi conflict
in neighboring Burundi were the two factors that led Hutu extremists to seize
power and incite the population toward genocide.
The Passivity of
the International Community
It
is not an exaggeration to say that the international community failed in Rwanda through lack of commitment, whether it was before or
after the beginning of the genocide. The UN found itself incapable of
fulfilling its mission to provide security because most of the great powers had
refused to provide the means to intervene. The United States contributed to
blocking Security Council decisions in a constant and deliberate manner.
In
contrast to what needed to be done, the international forces deployed in Kigali
were dramatically reduced. Later, when the UN decided to launch a humanitarian
operation, only France took up the task of arranging Operation Turquoise [8] because no other nation wanted to get involved.
The
honest examination of the facts, the only way to respond to ignominious accusations, firmly establishes that
France played no role in executing the genocide. It cannot be held responsible
for, and even less so found guilty of, the crimes it tried to prevent by all
means at its disposal, even though, unfortunately, it failed in this endeavor.
Further reading...
Notes
[1] Alain Juppé, then Minister of Foreign
Affairs, May 15, 1994.
[2] Resolution 2076 of November 2012, made
after the occupation de Goma by the M23 rebel group, with the aid of Rwandan
forces.
[3] Such were the accusations made by the
Rwandan government or its spokespersons (Mucyo report published in 2008, for
example).
[4] See UN report (December 1999), report of
the Organization of African Unity (May 2000), results of the ICTR
(International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) instructions by French and Spanish
judges.
[5] The Tutsis represented about 15% of the
population but dominated the Hutu majority. The colonizers theorized that the
Tutsis were descendants of conquerors from Ethiopia who subjugated the Hutu
masses. This racist view of Rwandan social relations was the ultimate cause of
the genocide.
[6] August 4, 1993.
[7] April 6, 1994.
[8] June 21 to August 21, 1994.
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